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ABSTRACT 
Critical road infrastructure (such as tunnels and overpasses) is of major significance to society and constitutes 
major components of interdependent, ‘systems and networks’. Failure in critical components of these wide area 
infrastructure systems can often result in cascading disturbances with secondary and tertiary impacts - some of 
which may become initiating sources of failure in their own right, triggering further systems failures across 
wider networks. Perrow1) considered the impact of our increasing use of technology in high-risk fields, analysing 
the implications on everyday life and argued that designers of these types of infrastructure systems cannot 
predict every possible failure scenario nor create perfect contingency plans for operators. 
Challenges exist for transport system operators in the conceptualisation and implementation of response and 
subsequent recovery planning for significant events. Disturbances can vary from reduced traffic flow causing 
traffic congestion throughout the local road network(s) and subsequent possible loss of income to businesses and 
industry to a major incident causing loss of life or complete loss of an asset. 
Many organisations and institutions, despite increasing recognition of the effects of crisis events, are not 
adequately prepared to manage crises2). It is argued that operators of land transport infrastructure are in a similar 
category of readiness given the recent instances of failures in road tunnels. These unexpected infrastructure 
failures, and their ultimately identified causes, suggest there is significant room for improvement. As a result, 
risk profiles for road transport systems are often complex due to the human behaviours and the inter-mix of 
technical and organisational components and the managerial coverage needed for the socio-technical 
components and the physical infrastructure. In this sense, the span of managerial oversight may require new 
approaches to asset management that combines the notion of risk and continuity management. 
This paper examines challenges in the planning of response and recovery practices of owner/operators of 
transport systems (above and below ground) in Australia covering: 
• Ageing or established infrastructure; and  
• New-build infrastructure. 
 
With reference to relevant international contexts this paper seeks to suggest options for enhancing the planning 
and practice for crisis response in these transport networks and as a result support the resilience of Critical 
Infrastructure.   




Crisis events are often critical turning points in a business’s life. It has been argued3) that whether such crises 
emerge from poor strategic positioning, managerial inertia or organisation stagnation such events suddenly 
shine the spotlight on any major problem in the design and activities of an organisational system. Research4) 
suggests, despite increasing recognition of the effects of crises, most organisations are found to have 
inadequately prepared to manage through a disturbance. The ability of organisations to keep operating in 
times of crisis is a significant requirement for public amenity, especially when these organisations manage 
public infrastructure.  
Critical road infrastructure (such as tunnels, bridges and overpasses) is of major significance to society and 
constitutes major components of interdependent, ‘systems and networks’. Failure in critical components of 
these infrastructure systems can often result in cascading disturbances with secondary and tertiary impacts - 
some of which may become initiating sources of failure in their own right, triggering further systems failures 
across wider networks.   
In the past, public organisations tended to prepare for known and expected emergencies (on the basis of a 
pre-existing risk assessments), but the administrative toolbox that is used for routine problems is of limited 
use in the face of the ‘un-foreseeable’ crisis5). This is often unacceptable when each element of the whole 
public infrastructure is networked together and any cascading effects will naturally affect other sites and 
projects and not just effect ‘their’ individual project any more.   
2. Transport Infrastructure 
The primary objective of all for-profit organisations is to maximise shareholder wealth and an effective risk 
management program enhances that stakeholder and corporate value. Be it a government or private 
organisation, the shareholder objectives may appear different but usually stakeholder value is the end 
objective. Privatising organisations that manage public infrastructure has added a further problem for 
management, particularly around communication and ultimately control of the assets6).  
It is generally understood that transport infrastructure is costly to design, construct and maintain. Often 
maintenance budgets are based on assumptions which have no bearing on the condition of the asset and 
requirement for any periodic maintenance. Periodic (Routine) maintenance is often the first type of 
maintenance to be delayed or reduced because of budget limitations. When maintenance is delayed or not 
carried out to schedule for special infrastructure types such as Tunnels and Bridges, the asset ages faster and 
its durability or operational life reduces accordingly. Nonetheless, for Tunnels and Bridges, the signs of age 
are often not obvious until a critical failure occurs. Owners or Custodians of public assets need to be aware 
of the consequences of not performing or delaying routine maintenance and the monitoring of traffic loads as 
these actions can age infrastructure (consume an asset) extremely quickly.   
As an example, if the pavement (bitumen) is designed to operate under 60,000 vehicles per day for eight 
years and the actual loads increase to 80,000 vehicles per day including 10% heavy articulated vehicles, this 
asset will require more detailed monitoring and the pavement will possibly require replacement earlier than 
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projected. However, if the asset was an aged bridge, traffic loads need to be well understood in order to 
model critical loads that can age the asset and possibly cause failures. 
As governments continue to rely on risk-financing models such as Public-Private Partnerships, they need to 
be aware that decisions made at each life cycle stage of an asset can extend or reduce its useful life. From the 
feasibility stage to disposal, if properly managed, an asset will realise its value beyond its investment by a 
dynamic process of allocating responsibility for oversighting viability of an asset and effective corporate 
governance.7) Throughout local road network(s), when significant disturbances occur the effects may be 
limited to reduced traffic flow causing congestion and possible loss of income to businesses or industry. 
Sources of disturbance impacting road systems may not even be directly linked to the physical failure of 
infrastructure itself but might be triggered by other incidents such as loss of electricity, within a business or 
other infrastructure component. In Australia, our dependence on road infrastructure has grown 
commensurate with urban growth with these networks forming the logistical life blood on our cities. As a 
result, public expectations about the efficiency and reliability of road networks are critical.   
The challenges of planning response & recovery in ageing and new-build infrastructure vary due to design 
considerations and the operational requirements at that time of construction. Design of recent infrastructure 
should consider new technologies and issues central to crisis response ranging from terrorism to traffic 
congestion. While crisis response to aging infrastructure will be similar to that of new infrastructure, the 
recovery and setup could be considerably different. Thus making a standard and planned response and 
recovery for all types of situations challenging and often with complex technical structures full risk profiles 
are incomplete. As previously mentioned, public organisations tend to prepare for known and expected 
emergencies using assumptions or learning from other facilities as the basis for the formulation of their 
response strategies. Justification for more complex failure modes that can influence infrastructure design or 
adding more complex operational requirements may be limited by budget constraints. The ramifications of 
these decisions are now more far reaching in the interconnected infrastructure we rely upon every day. 
The challenges of crisis response planning in organisations managing transport infrastructure are many. For 
example, the application of comprehensive risk assessment processes that can identify and inform mitigation 
options for critical sources of disturbance are at the core of effective management. Formulating a detailed 
strategy for applying risk-based thinking and analysis that includes: capabilities for risk identification, 
assessment and mitigation through to sharing uncertainty with third parties or by insurance options, is 
critical8. If risk based assessments are carried out, infrastructure managers are better placed to make 
informed judgements on the most viable preventive and reactive options that suit their needs. 
Recently the Australian Government altered their approach to critical infrastructure resilience to go beyond 
risk management and business continuity planning to also address hazards and disturbances that are 
unforeseen or unexpected9. The resilience approach builds capacity within organisations to not only 
effectively respond to a crisis, but also be able to learn and adapt from an event. This approach moves from 




3. Crisis Planning: Issues and Opportunities 
Riddell10) suggests that the origins of the generic practices in handling emergencies derive from both Cold 
War planning and the challenges posed by a spate of major strikes in the early 1970’s. All emergencies and 
crises in this historical context have similar stages especially from the perspective of a governmental or 
regulatory oversight context.  These are: 
• A slow initial response to the event 
• Confusion about what is happening 
• Well published meeting of government committees 
• Initially ineffective statements to the media 
• Increasing alarm, the resolution, and a rapid disappearance from the headlines. 
This general approach to management of disasters is now unacceptable. Planning for disruptive events and 
responses is an expected requirement of organisations responsible for managing public infrastructure. Figure 
1 details a more recent approach when anticipating the source(s) of disturbances are as important as being 
able to rapidly respond to them.  
 
 
Figure 1 Australian Government’s approach to Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy 
Having resilient infrastructure is the key goal of the Australian Government11) which includes the important 
objective of prevention of a crisis or reducing the impact of a disruption or accident12). Crisis events can 
originate from many sources. They can be random events or events that happen due to ignorance of the rules 
and regulations, thus having the appearance of a random event when a crisis can take place due to a person or 
organisation not carrying out or completing a task. Crises can be external or internal to an organisation; they 
can be natural or man-made. So the nature and number of possible crisis events can make them unpredictable 




Figure 2 Development of a Disaster13) 
 
If an incident is escalating to the point where it is moving beyond an emergency, without a significant 
management response, the situation can develop into a disaster where the organisation is in jeopardy and 
may not recover. Figure 2 indicates the escalating style of an event. If it does recover, it can be a different 
organisation. For example, the organisation may have new management (manager), new functions or a 
reduced size. The Institute of Crisis Management in 200414) suggested that crises from natural disasters, 
catastrophic loss of utility, large industrial accidents or collateral damage following acts of violence 
represent less than 20% of total reported causes of organisational crises.  Figure 3 gives a cross section of the 
causes of organisational crises.  
 




The vast majority of crisis events arise from the escalation of routine management issues to significant 
disruptive events. Though this statistic is ten years old, organisations are still not required to have an 
organised plan for crisis management or recognise that a plan should be considered. Further variability exists 
dependent upon the competency and experience of the manager dealing with the crisis, the organisation may 
not have the planning in place but the right person taking the lead can significantly mitigate the impact. 
Issues can develop from internal HR, legal or processes issues to external issues effecting manufacture of 
items due to poor logistics. Each organisation has its specific threats and triggers.  It is how these incidents 
are managed and how an issue develops and the degree and speed of response from higher leadership 
positions that can determine the resulting impact on an organisation.  
3.1 Recent Catastrophic Failures of Infrastructure 
Australia is not immune from serious crisis events and failures. There have been many recent failures and 
significant events within the transport infrastructure that have had serious effects on the day to day issues of 
the public within Australia and Internationally.   
a) Two years into construction of the Westgate Bridge in Melbourne, at 11.50am on 15th October 
1970, the 112m span between piers 10 and 11 collapsed and fell 50m to the ground and water below. 
Thirty-five construction workers were killed. A Royal Commission into the collapse was established, 
and concluded on 14 July 197116). It attributed the failure of the bridge to two causes of the structural 
design and the unusual method of construction. 
b) On 5th January 1975, a bulk ore carrier travelling up the Derwent River, in Hobart collided with 
several pylons of the Tasman Bridge, causing a large section of the bridge deck to collapse onto the 
ship and into the river below. Twelve people were killed, including seven crew on board the ship, and 
the five occupants of four cars which fell 45m after driving off the bridge.17)  
c) On the morning of 24th March 1999, 39 people died when a Belgian transport truck carrying flour 
and margarine caught fire in the Mont Blanc tunnel. As the incident developed, this was not yet a fire 
emergency; the driver stopped in the middle of the 11.6km tunnel and attempted to fight the fire but 
basically lost control.  There had been 16 other truck fires in the tunnel over the previous 35 years, 
always extinguished on the spot by the drivers. Other than the issues of the systems and fighting the 
fire most of drivers rolled up their windows and waited for rescue.18)  
d) On 10th July 2006, a concrete ceiling panel weighing 3 tons fell on a car traveling on the two-lane 
ramp connecting northbound I-93 to eastbound I-90 in South Boston, killing one person who was a 
passenger, and injuring her husband. The collapse and closure of the tunnel greatly snarled traffic in 
the city and the resulting traffic jams are cited as contributing to the death of another person, a heart 
attack victim who died en-route to Boston Medical Centre when his ambulance was caught in one such 
traffic jam two weeks after the collapse.19)  
e) On 23rd March 2007 just before 10am, in the Burley Tunnel in Melbourne, a pile-up occurred in the 
tunnel involving three trucks and four cars. The crash resulted in an explosion and a subsequent fire 
which reached temperatures in excess of 1,000 °C and killed three people.  This particular issue was 
caused by a driver who was later gaoled. The coroner’s report was released Mar 2013.20) 
7 
 
f) On 1st August 2007, the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis buckled. Rush-hour traffic that was stalled 
on the bridge, went into free fall as dozens of vehicles plummeted into the Mississippi River. Thirteen 
people died, and 145 were hurt.21) This triggered a country wide inspection of America’s aging 
infrastructure.  
g) On 3rd Dec 2012, Concrete ceiling panels fell onto moving vehicles deep inside the Japanese 
Sasago tunnel, and authorities confirmed nine deaths before suspending rescue work. At this stage it is 
suspected that a steel bracket failure has bought down concrete roof panels. The disaster has prompted 
Japanese authorities to order emergency checks on dozens of other tunnels across the country that 
have a similar design, as questions were raised about whether aging parts may have contributed to the 
collapse.22) 
h) On 20th Feb 2013, Motorists were experiencing extensive peak hour delays following a truck fire 
in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel. Traffic was backed up at both ends of the tunnel after a freightliner in 
the southbound lane caught on fire just after 4pm, activating a fire alarm and causing the closure of the 
tunnel.23) 
Up to late 2012, major tunnel incidents since 1995 have killed 713 people worldwide.24) This figure does not 
include other road infrastructure failures. This small selection indicates crises happen in our public 
infrastructure and are managed and can often be avoided. How can Australia learn from these incidents as 
our infrastructure ages and new infrastructure comes on line? 
3.2 Resilient Infrastructure via Crisis Management: A Goal 
There are many definitions of resilience and what it means.  Bruneau25) describes resilience as the capacity of 
the system to reduce the probability of failure, to reduce the consequences from failure and to reduce the 
time needed to carry out all the response and recovery activities.  
Resilience is an important concept and it forms one of the key attributes sort by crisis ready organisations.  
This resilience capability allows an organisation to be able to absorb the effects of a disturbance and 
hopefully avoid a crisis, thus having some form of stability26). Figure 4 below indicates the three phases and 
a level of resilience for a system.  The trigger event shown indicates a level of ‘impact’. Events can take 
organisations to levels where they may not recover for whatever reason, so an organisation developing a 
significant resilience level enhances the organisation’s ability to recover. A level of resilience can be 
interpreted as a capability to continue functioning while being affected by stressors.  Different events will 
have different effects on an organisations ability to maintain operations.  
Figure 4 represents an organisation’s functionality when impacted by a disturbance. It splits resilient 
capability into four different period elements: Mitigation, Preparation, Response and Recovery.  In the pre-
crisis phase of Mitigation, risks are identified to avoid the occurrence of any incident or at least reduce the 
possibility of negative effects on human life or property. The Preparation element includes organisational 
planning activities for dealing with foreseeable events. When the triggering event takes place, Response 
actions are preformed to immediately minimise the potential impact and to reduce as far as practicable the 
potential losses to be suffered through the incident.  Post crisis phase is the Recovery element which is the 
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return to stable (maybe normal) operations27.  It is also where the analysis and learning occurs so to ensure 
that if an event of similar nature occurs again, it should have  less of an impact.  
            
Figure 4 Building Resilience Capability28 
Labaka29 describes four resilience dimensions divided into specific resilience friendly policy areas (three are 
described in the Table 1 below). The research indicates that the organisation resilience level will be enhanced 
and consequently it will be able to reduce the impact of major industrial incidents by implementation and 
inclusion of these policies. 
These polices and dimensions are detailed in Table 1. 
Table 1 Dimensions and policies of Resilience30 
Dimension Policy Definition 
Technical resilience CI design and construction 
 
This refers to the quality, robustness, redundancy and security of the 
design and construction of the infrastructure or element that the CI is 
responsible for. This should include increase security of the system 
by increasing the number of systems and/or redundancy. 
CI maintenance As part of design is the ability to perform high quality maintenance 
activities in order to improve the systems performance and reliability. 
Part of these criteria also complies with new legislation.  
CI data acquisition and 
transmission system 
 
This policy deals with the quality, reliability and effectiveness of the 
sensors and computer equipment that should be set up to supervise 
and control the CI. This includes adequate software to control the 
system. 
Public crisis response 
equipment availability 
The availability, quality, redundancy, reliability and security level of 
the technical equipment belonging to public bodies, first responders 
and society is essential in order to face a crisis, repair damage and 
respond to emergency situation. 
Organisational 
Resilience  
CI capacity for crisis 
detection, communication 
and analysis  
This corresponds to the capacity of operators to detect, communicate 
and analyse a crisis, proposing new preventative measure for the 
future. This includes training and learning systems. 
CI workforce training and 
commitment 
Workers at the CI must be adequately trained prior to the occurrence 
of a crisis so they know how to respond.  They should be aware and 
know of the procedures and protocols when something unexpected 
occurs. Responding in a timely manner and in a coordinated manner 
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can reduce time during the crisis and any negative effects. 
First responders training This training has to do with how first responders are prepared to face 
a crisis.  This includes training and familiarity of the organisation/site.  
‘Actions on’ can detail and reduce a dangerous unknown situation to 
a known and more familiar less hazardous situation.  
Government preparation A governments main role is to properly communicate the situation to 
the public and give advice as this will diminish the public’s anxiety. 
They should also lead and coordinate all the entities and deal with the 
crisis. 
Economic resilience CI crisis budget CI’s should have funds set aside in order to cover repairs and 
replacements should a crisis occur. This assists their economic 
resilience level but also allows the CI to bounce back by reducing 
their response and recovery times. 
Public crisis budget Public institutions should also set aside funds in order to assist 
stakeholders and society. This allows organisations, society and first 
responders to obtain resources in a reasonable time.  If funding is 
scarce the respond and recovery can be hampered.  
 
Using three of the dimensions and ten polices of resilience, an organisation can increase their level of 
resilience, but there is a requirement that these considerations start within the design considerations of new 
infrastructure.  If this consideration does not take place within the design phase, the opportunity can be 
missed for some of these considerations for the life of the asset. Builders of infrastructure are far from 
interested in considering detailed operational plans or the future life cycle of the asset. The investment into 
the proper design consideration needs to take place in the early stages of infrastructure planning to allow for 
a complete life cycle consideration for the asset. For this requirement to take place, contract documentation 
needs to include forms of these policies or resilience requirements. Draft standards (draft ISO 55001 Asset 
Management) are attempting to consider elements of these criteria ensuring future asset owners encapsulate 
this planning process as a requirement for the management of their infrastructure embedding a long term 
focus in the minds of their asset maintainers. These types of regulatory requirements would assist in the 
proper management of public infrastructure and need to be mandatory requirements to increase durability of 
our public assets.  
4. The Tools to improve Crisis Management 
The draft Asset Management standard ISO5500131) is one possible mechanism to improve and better connect 
the operational requirements of the asset to the design and the feasibility considerations required of 
infrastructure projects. Asset Management is considered a Risk Management process for asset life cycle 
management and this standard is still to be released and applied to the industry. However a risk management 
connection to improving crisis planning is required now. Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a 
specific form of risk management process which identifies an organisations exposure to internal and external 
threats to provide effective prevention and recovery for the organisation while maintaining system 
integrity32).  
4.1 Business Continuity Management  
BCM is a process concerned with the whole business management, good governance and compliance. 
Companies not planning for incidents, logistic issues, interruptions or crisis events stand to lose more than 
just time and money. Public confidence that an organisation can manage crisis events and recover from 
incidents will enhance not only reputation but better long-term outcomes for that organisation. From this 
point of view, the knock-on effects can be limited when organisations have Business Continuity Plans (BCP) 
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due to the fact that operational response plans have been considered and triggered into action (similar to the 
actions depicted in Figure 4). Considering these three dimensions and ten polices of resilience from the 
previous sections, can form the basic key elements of consideration for BCM.  Business continuity demands 
total commitment at all levels within the organisation33).  
BCM can provide a degree of assurance beyond an insurance policy. What value can be placed on a 
company’s reputation, its link within a supply chain or the personnel they have working for them? BCM is 
about having a robust process that allows individuals to: 
• better understand uncertainty about the future, 
• realise the potential for different types of disruption, and 
• better plan for the future management of those disruptions, and to put in place business improvement 
to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of significant future disruption34).  
 
4.2 The Strategy 
In recent years, business processes research and now standards are beginning to be aligned on business 
continuity practises. Standards Australia and New Zealand have published Business Continuity Management, 
Handbook 292-200635). This handbook is a practical guide for enhancing an organisation’s resilience. The 
new more recent AN/NZ 5050, Business Continuity standard still appears to be inadequate and is similar to 
the basic risk management standard. The business continuity strategy has to meet basic criteria to be an 
effective business risk management process and to have the benefits that can be seen in the approach taken in 
Figure 1, with the foreseeable risks plus consideration of unforeseeable risks. These criteria should also 
include:  
• more holistic and comprehensive consideration of risk with the BCM process; 
• improve integration between BCM and risk management activities within the organisation;  
• appropriate organisational focus on priority risks, including those related to business continuity; 
• more cost effective use of resources (time, people and budget); and 
• improve focus of BCM activity on business improvement, rather than just reactive planning36). 
The process of reducing uncertainty will aid in this business process but assessing unforeseeable risks can 
also be an art and could be restricted by managerial experience.  
4.3 The Reality of Practise  
It is often a critical but forgotten idea that organisations should practise what they preach.  Budgets and the 
day to day management of companies can distract us from future planning. In our litigious society, the 
requirement for best practise have driven organisations to ensure they have the tools to ensure they can prove 
they have followed ‘best practise’, without sometime considering what is best for their organisation. Most 
private infrastructure organisations appear to have incident/emergency response plans which are in essence a 
form of BCP however are not what the organisation practice. These plans can sit on the shelf, ticking the 
box, and waiting for an incident. Never checked or exercised. The public are going to demand more response 
requirements to ensure a quicker and better recovery of our infrastructure when it fails. Private infrastructure 
organisations appear to have the tools; do government organisations?  
As our infrastructure ages in Australia, we need to be aware and learn from large scale failures that have 
taken place in Japan, USA and Europe and ensure we can prevent them and/or are ready for these types of 
critical failure. Could we manage a critical tunnel failure due to terrorism or infrastructure failure? Our 
organisations need to focus on establishing a minimum acceptable level of capability and performance to 
quickly return to a routine operational capability and performance.  
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There needs to be a pooling and sharing of information to ensure the application of better practice principles 
and policies of BCM to effectively increase the resilience level for infrastructure organisations. The legal 
frameworks of the future could hamper system recovery as organisations worry more about legal liability 
than the service to the public.   
The BCM handbook gives a basic framework for the Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and offers much 
generic content for strategies which then require further development and consideration. Each plan is 
dependent on the organisations operational requirements and these vary on risk profiles, critical functions of 
the business, structures and interdependencies to name a few examples. In their application to road 
infrastructure, consideration would have to take place on the aspects of the policies listed in Table 1 to 
further enhance the asset. When allowing for complex public infrastructure, the plans appear to be simplistic, 
however there are many interrelated issues from design, built in redundancies, currency of maintenance to 
operational techniques and incident responses, let alone the interfaces into other interconnections of the 
public networks that need to be considered. These need to be tested regularly as a BCP is not a document that 
sits on the shelf once developed and pulled out and a check list followed in an incident.  Staff training and 
familiarity of responses make the BCP and BCM process current and organisational behaviour during an 
incident becomes a known response.  The difficultly can be the free thinking and use of ‘social capital’ in the 
governmental process can often be limiting. This free thinking is often required during incidents not to 
always automatically follow the checklist and provide a dynamic response to what is happening at the 
incident location. Social capital has been defined as an asset that inheres in social relationships and 
networks.37) Social Capital is basically the goodwill that exists between organisations or individuals by their 
social interaction that can be mobilised to achieve outcomes or facilitate action. This topic itself could 
develop into a paper, but it is understood that more actions can be achieved when more than one organisation 




Our critical infrastructure systems are becoming interrelated and therefore require holistic solutions for the 
resolution of Business Recovery. These systems need to be more resilient and anticipate and plan for 
disturbances. Failure in critical components of these wide area infrastructure systems can often result in 
cascading disturbances resulting in multiple failures across wider road infrastructure networks.  
 
In Australia, the frameworks of infrastructure protection are still maturing. The Australian Government38 
recognised the traditional approach of managing foreseeable disruptions of Critical Infrastructure had to 
change. The production of a standard response and recovery plans is now becoming unacceptable in our 
interconnected society. The planning for natural and human intended threats need to be planned and 
exercised within public infrastructure with a focus on the unforeseeable. In the past, public organisations 
tended to prepare for known and expected emergencies, this is now unacceptable when each element of the 
whole public infrastructure is networked together. Government needs to take a leadership role in enhancing 
critical transport infrastructure and ensure owners and operators can operate at an acceptable level of 
capability.  
 
The background and inspiration for this paper is the notion that planning for and development of business 
continuity plans needs to be further enhanced in public organisations managing critical transport 
infrastructure. Business Continuity is an activity that takes place before an incident and is applied at the 
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